Efficiency Loss in Revenue Optimal Auctions by Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce
ar
X
iv
:1
00
5.
11
21
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
3 S
ep
 20
10
Efficiency Loss in Revenue Optimal Auctions
Vineet Abhishek∗ and Bruce Hajek†
September 12, 2010
Abstract
We study efficiency loss in Bayesian revenue optimal auctions. We quantify this as the worst
case ratio of loss in the realized social welfare to the social welfare that can be realized by
an efficient auction. Our focus is on auctions with single-parameter buyers and where buyers’
valuation sets are finite. For binary valued single-parameter buyers with independent (not
necessarily identically distributed) private valuations, we show that the worst case efficiency
loss ratio (ELR) is no worse than it is with only one buyer; moreover, it is at most 1/2. Moving
beyond the case of binary valuations but restricting to single item auctions, where buyers’ private
valuations are independent and identically distributed, we obtain bounds on the worst case ELR
as a function of number of buyers, cardinality of buyers’ valuation set, and ratio of maximum
to minimum possible values that buyers can have for the item.
1 Introduction
The two prevalent themes in auction theory are revenue maximization for seller - referred to as
optimality, and social welfare maximization - referred to as efficiency. For example, VCG [1, 2, 3]
is the most widely studied efficient auction, while a Bayesian optimal single item auction for inde-
pendent private value model was first characterized by Myerson in his seminal work [4]. VCG has
been generalized for combinatorial auctions (see [5] for a description); Myerson’s optimal auction
framework has been extended to a more general single-parameter setting (see [6] for a description),
and to auctions with single-minded buyers [7].
An allocation of items among buyers generates value for the items. The realized social welfare
is defined as the total generated value. This is an upper bound on the revenue that a seller can
extract1. Thus, an allocation that creates a large social welfare might appear as a precursor to
extracting large revenue; the seller can extract more revenue by first creating a large total value
for the items and then collecting a part of it as payments from the buyers. However, in general, an
optimal auction is not efficient and vice versa. As presented in [4], in optimal single item auctions
where buyers’ private valuations are drawn independently from the same distribution (referred to
as same priors from here on), the seller sets a common reserve price and does not sell the item
if the values reported by all buyers are below the reserve price. When buyers’ private values are
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1This follows from the individual rationality assumption defined later in this paper.
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realized from different distributions (referred to as different priors from here on), then not only can
the reserve prices be different for different buyers, the seller need not always sell the item to the
buyer with the highest reported value. However, an efficient auction like VCG will award the item
to the buyer who values it the most in all such scenarios. Moreover, as we show later in this paper,
in multiple item auctions with single-parameter buyers, an optimal auction need not be efficient,
even if the buyers have the same priors and there are no reserve prices.
We study how much an optimal auction loses in efficiency when compared with an efficient
auction. Our metric is the worst case normalized difference in the realized social welfares by an
efficient auction and an optimal auction, where the normalization is with respect to the social welfare
realized by an efficient auction. The worst case is taken over all possible probability distributions
on buyers’ valuations. We refer to this as the worst case efficiency loss ratio (henceforth ELR).
This ratio quantifies how much the goal of revenue maximization can be in conflict with the social
goal of welfare maximization.
Two previous works that also study the trade-off between optimality and efficiency are [8]
and [9]. However, the metrics used by [8] and [9] are the number of extra buyers required by an
efficient auction to match an optimal auction in revenue, and the number of extra buyers required
by an optimal auction to match an efficient auction in the realized social welfare, respectively.
This is fundamentally different from the problem we study here. In [10], authors find bounds
on the informational cost introduced by the presence of private information (see Section 5 for its
relationship with the ELR) for a class of resource allocation problems, but for continuous probability
distributions on the cost of resources, and under some restrictive assumptions on the probability
distributions.
The main contributions of this paper are following. We first focus on optimal auctions with
binary valued single-parameter buyers with different priors. We show that the worst case ELR is
no worse than it is with only one buyer; moreover, it is at most 1/2. A tighter bound is obtained
for auctions with identical items and buyers with same priors. Moving beyond the case of binary
valuations, we focus on single item optimal auctions where buyers have same priors. We reduce the
problem of finding the worst case ELR into a relatively simple optimization problem involving only
the common probability vector of buyers. For single buyer case, we find a closed form expression for
the worst case ELR as function of r - the ratio of the maximum to the minimum possible value of
the item for the buyer, and K - the number of discrete values that the buyer can have for the item.
For multiple buyers, we provide lower and upper bounds on the worst case ELR as a function of
r, K, and N - the number of buyers. These bounds are tight asymptotically as K goes to infinity.
We also show that when buyers have different priors, the lower bound on the worst case ELR is
almost the same as the worst case ELR with only one buyer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our model, notation, and
definitions. Section 3 summarizes the structure of optimal auctions. Section 4 formally defines
the problem under investigation and presents the bounds on the ELR. Section 5 provides some
comments and Section 6 gives a summary of results.
2 Model, Definitions, and Notation
Consider N buyers competing for a set of items that a seller wants to sell. The set of buyers is
denoted by N , {1, 2, . . . , N}. A buyer is said to be a winner if he gets any one of his desired
bundles of items. We restrict to single-parameter buyers - a buyer n gets a positive value v∗n if he
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is a winner, irrespective of the bundle he gets; otherwise, he gets zero value. The bundles desired
by the buyers are publicly known. The value v∗n is referred to as the type of buyer n. The type of
a buyer is known only to him and constitutes his private information.
For each buyer n, the seller and the other buyers have imperfect information about his true
type v∗n; they model it by a discrete random variable Xn. The probability distribution of Xn is
common knowledge. Xn is assumed to take values from a set Xn , {x
1
n, x
2
n, . . . , x
Kn
n } of cardinal-
ity Kn, where 0 ≤ x
1
n < x
2
n < . . . < x
Kn
n . The probability that Xn is equal to x
i
n is denoted by p
i
n;
i.e., pin , P
[
Xn = x
i
n
]
. We assume that pin > 0 for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn. Thus, the type v
∗
n
can be interpreted as a specific realization of the random variable Xn, known only to buyer n.
Random variables [Xn]n∈N are assumed to be independent
2.
In general, the structure of the problem restricts the possible sets of winners. Such constraints
are captured by defining a set A to be the collection of all possible sets of winners; i.e., A ∈ A if
A ⊆ N and all buyers in A can win simultaneously. We assume that ∅ ∈ A, and A is downward
closed ; i.e., if A ∈ A and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ A. Also, assume that for each buyer n, there is a set
A ∈ A such that n ∈ A.
The single-parameter model is rich enough to capture many scenarios of interest. In single item
auctions, a buyer gets a certain positive value if he wins the item and zero otherwise. Here, A
consists of all singletons {n}, n ∈ N (and empty set ∅). In an auction of S identical items, each
buyer wants any one of the S items and has the same value for any one of them. Here, A is any
subset of buyers of size at most S. Similarly, in auctions with single-minded buyers with known
bundles3, each buyer n is interested only in a specific (known) bundle b∗n of items and has a value v
∗
n
for any bundle bn such that bn contains the bundle b
∗
n, while he has zero value for any other bundle.
Here, A is collections of buyers with disjoint bundles.
Denote a typical reported type (henceforth, referred to as a bid) of a buyer n by vn, where
vn ∈ Xn, and let v , (v1, v2, . . . , vN ) be the vector of bids of everyone. DefineX , (X1,X2, . . . ,XN )
andX , X1×X2×. . .×XN . We use the standard notation of v−n , (v1, . . . , vn−1, vn+1, . . . , vN ) and
v , (vn,v−n). Similar interpretations are used forX−n and X−n. Henceforth, in any further usage,
vn, v−n, and v are always in the sets Xn, X−n, and X respectively. Let xn , (x
1
n, x
2
n, . . . , x
Kn
n ),
x1:N , (x1,x2, . . . ,xN ), and define pn and p1:N similarly.
3 Preliminaries on Finite Support Bayesian Optimal Auction
In this section we summarize the structure of an optimal auction for single-parameter buyers. The
presentation here is based on [7], adapted for single-parameter buyers. Readers are referred to [7]
and references therein (in particular [11]) for further details. We will be focusing only on the auction
mechanisms where buyers are asked to report their types directly (referred to as direct mechanism).
In light of the revelation principle4 [4], the restriction to direct mechanisms is without any loss of
optimality.
A direct auction mechanism is specified by an allocation rule pi : X 7→ [0, 1]|A|, and a payment
rule M : X 7→ RN . Given a bid vector v, the allocation rule pi(v) , [πA(v)]A∈A is a probability
2This is referred to as the independent private value model, a fairly standard model in auction theory.
3For single-minded buyers, both the desired bundle of items and its value for a buyer are his private information.
However, if the bundles are known then this reduces to single-parameter model.
4Revelation principle says that, given a mechanism and a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) for that mechanism,
there exists a direct mechanism in which truth-telling is a BNE, and allocation and payment outcomes are same as
in the given BNE of the original mechanism.
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distribution over the collection A of possible sets of winners. For each A ∈ A, πA(v) is the
probability that the set of buyers A win simultaneously. The payment rule is defined as M ,
(M1,M2, . . . ,MN ), where Mn(v) is the payment (expected payment in case of random allocation)
that buyer n makes to the seller when the bid vector is v. Let Qn(v) be the probability that buyer
n wins in the auction when the bid vector is v; i.e,
Qn(v) ,
∑
A∈A:n∈A
πA(v). (1)
Given that the value of buyer n is v∗n, and the bid vector is v, the payoff (expected payoff in
case of random allocation) of buyer n is:
σn(v; v
∗
n) , Qn(v)v
∗
n −Mn(v). (2)
So buyers are assumed to be risk neutral and have quasilinear payoffs (a standard assumption
in auction theory). The mechanism (pi,M) and the payoff functions [σn]n∈N induce a game of
incomplete information among the buyers. The seller’s goal is to design an auction mechanism
(pi,M) to maximize his expected revenue at a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the induced game.
Again, using the revelation principle, the seller can restrict only to the auctions where truth-telling
is a BNE (referred to as incentive compatibility) without any loss of optimality.
For the above revenue maximization problem to be well defined, assume that the seller cannot
force the buyers to participate in an auction and impose arbitrarily high payments on them. Thus,
a buyer will voluntarily participate in an auction only if his payoff from participation is nonnegative
(referred to as individual rationality). The seller is assumed to have free disposal of items and may
decide not to sell some or all items for certain bid vectors.
The idea now, as in [4], is to express incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and feasible
allocations as mathematical constraints, and formulate the revenue maximization objective as an
optimization problem under these constraints. To this end, for each n ∈ N , define the following
functions:
qn(vn) , E [Qn(vn,X−n)] , (3)
mn(vn) , E [Mn(vn,X−n)] , (4)
Here, qn(vn) is the expected probability that buyer n wins given that he reports his type as vn while
everyone else is truthful. The expectation is over the type of everyone else; i.e., over X−n. Similarly,
mn(vn) is the expected payment that buyer n makes to the seller. The incentive compatibility and
individual rationality constraints can be expressed mathematically as follows:
1. Incentive compatibility (IC): For any n ∈ N , and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Kn,
qn(x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(x
i
n) ≥ qn(x
j
n)x
i
n −mn(x
j
n). (5)
Notice that, given Xn = x
i
n, the left side of (5) is the payoff of buyer n from reporting his
type truthfully (assuming everyone else is also truthful), while the right side is the payoff
from misreporting his type to xjn.
2. Individual rationality (IR): For any n ∈ N , and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn,
qn(x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(x
i
n) ≥ 0. (6)
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Under IC, all buyers report their true types. Hence, the expected revenue that the seller gets is
E
[∑N
n=1Mn(X)
]
. The expectation here is over the random vector X. Thus, the optimal auction
problem is to maximize the seller’s expected revenue, E
[∑N
n=1Mn(X)
]
, subject to the IC and IR
constraints.
Define the virtual-valuation function, wn, of a buyer n as:
wn(x
i
n) =
 xin − (xi+1n − xin)
(
∑Kn
j=i+1 p
j
n)
pin
if 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1,
xKnn if i = Kn.
(7)
The virtual-valuation function wn is said to be regular if wn(x
i
n) ≤ wn(x
i+1
n ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
The proposition below identifies the maximum expected revenue for a given allocation rule, over
all payment rules that meet the IC and IR constraints. In particular, it identifies whether such
payment rules exist.
Proposition 1 (from [7]). Let pi be an allocation rule and let [Qn]n∈N and [qn]n∈N be obtained
from pi by (1) and (3). A payment rule satisfying the IC and IR constraints exists for pi if and
only if qn(x
i
n) ≤ qn(x
i+1
n ) for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Given such pi and a payment rule M
satisfying the IC and IR constraints, the seller’s revenue satisfies:
E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(X)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
.
Moreover, a payment rule M achieving this bound exists, and any such M satisfies:
mn(x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
(qn(x
j
n)− qn(x
j−1
n ))x
j
n,
for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, where we use the notational convention qn(x
0
n) , 0.
Given pi satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1, let R(pi) denote the maximum revenue to
the seller under the IC and IR constraints. From Proposition 1 and (1),
R(pi) = E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
= E
[∑
A∈A
πA(X)
(∑
n∈A
wn(Xn)
)]
. (8)
The above suggests that an optimal auction can be found by selecting the allocation rule pi (and
in turn [Qn]n∈N and [qn]n∈N ) that assigns nonzero probabilities only to the feasible sets of winners
with the maximum total virtual valuations for each bid vector v. If all wn’s are regular, then
it can be verified that such an allocation rule satisfies the monotonicity condition on the qn’s
needed by Proposition 1. However, if the wn’s are not regular, the resulting allocation rule would
not necessarily satisfy the required monotonicity condition on the qn’s. This problem can be
remedied by using another function, wn, called the monotone virtual valuation (henceforth MVV),
constructed graphically as follows.
Let (g0n, h
0
n) , (0,−x
1
n), (g
i
n, h
i
n) ,
(∑i
j=1 p
j
n,−xi+1n (
∑Kn
j=i+1 p
j
n)
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1, and
(gKnn , h
Kn
n ) , (1, 0). Then, wn(x
i
n) is the slope of the line joining the point (g
i−1
n , h
i−1
n ) to the point
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(gin, h
i
n); i.e., wn(x
i
n) = (h
i
n−h
i−1
n )/(g
i
n−g
i−1
n ). Find the lower convex hull of points [(g
i
n, h
i
n)]0≤i≤Kn ,
and let h
i
n be the point on this convex hull corresponding to g
i
n. Then, wn(x
i
n) is the slope of the
line joining the point (gi−1n , h
i−1
n ) to the point (g
i
n, h
i
n); i.e, wn(x
i
n) = (h
i
n−h
i−1
n )/(g
i
n−g
i−1
n ). Notice
that, wn(x
i
n) ≤ wn(x
i+1
n ) for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Also, if wn is regular, wn is equal
to wn.
The process of finding virtual valuations and monotone virtual valuations can be explained
using Figure 1. Since the virtual-valuation function of a buyer depends only on the probability
distribution of his type, we describe the scheme for a typical random variable X, where we have
dropped the subscript. Suppose that X takes four different values {x1, x2, x3, x4} with correspond-
ing probabilities {p1, p2, p3, p4}. Draw vertical lines separated from each other by distances p1, p2,
p3, and p4 as shown in the figure. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, join the point −xi on the y-axis to the x-axis
at 1 (sum of probabilities). Call such line as line i. Then, (g0, h0) = (0,−x1) and (g4, h4) = (1, 0).
The intersection of line 2 with the first vertical line is the point (g1, h1). Similarly, the intersection
of line 3 with the second vertical line is the point (g2, h2) and so on. Virtual-valuation function
w is given by the slopes of the lines connecting these points. For the case shown in the figure,
w(x1) > w(x2) and hence virtual-valuation function is not regular. Here, the the lower convex
hull of the points (gi, hi)’s is taken. The slopes of individual segments of this convex hull give
the monotone virtual valuation w(xi). This is equivalent to replacing w(x1) and w(x2) by their
weighted mean, i.e., w(x1) = w(x2) = (p1w(x1) + p2w(x2))/(p1 + p2).
p
1
p
2
p
3
p
4
(1,0)
(0 0)
x1
,
)(
1
xw
)(
1
xw
x 2
)()(
44
xwxw  
)(
2
xw
_
_
)(
2
xw
)()(
33
xwxw  _
_
x 3
x 4 w
wslopesarevirtualvaluations,
slopesaremonotonevirtualvaluations, _
Figure 1: Virtual valuations and monotone virtual valuations as the slopes of the graph.
The following proposition establishes the optimality of the allocation rule obtained by using wn.
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Proposition 2 (from [7]). Let pi be any allocation rule satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1
and let [Qn]n∈N be obtained from pi by (1). Then,
E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
, (9)
where equality is achieved by any allocation rule pi that maximizes
∑N
n=1Qn(v)wn(vn) for each bid
vector v.
An optimal auction, which uses the MVVs just defined, is the maximum weight algorithm shown
as Algorithm 1. The setW(v) is the collection of all feasible subsets of buyers with maximum total
MVVs for the given bid vector v. Since A is downward closed and ∅ ∈ A, no buyer n with
wn(vn) < 0 is included in the set of winners W (v). Depending on the tie-breaking rule, a buyer n
with wn(vn) = 0 may or may not be included in the set of winners. Assume that only buyers with
wn(vn) > 0 are considered. Since wn(x
i
n) ≤ wn(x
i+1
n ), the seller equivalently sets a reserve price
for each buyer n. A buyer whose bid is below his reserve price never wins. From [7], the reserve
price x∗n for buyer n is:
x∗n = max
{
vn : vn ∈ argmax
v̂n∈Xn
v̂nP [Xn ≥ v̂n]
}
. (10)
In the example given in Figure 1, this corresponds to the y-intercept of the line through the
lowermost point of the graph and the point (1, 0), which is x3.
Algorithm 1 Maximum weight algorithm
Given a bid vector v:
1. Compute wn(vn) for each n ∈ N .
2. Take pi(v) to be any probability distribution on the collection W(v) defined as:
W(v) , argmax
A∈A
∑
n∈A
wn(vn).
Obtain the set of winners W (v) by sampling from W(v) according to pi(v).
3. Collect payments given by:
Mn(v) =
∑
i:xin≤vn
(
Qn(x
i
n,v−n)−Qn(x
i−1
n ,v−n)
)
xin,
where Qn is given by (1), and Qn(x
0
n,v−n) , 0.
4 Efficiency Loss in Optimal Auctions
Given any incentive compatible auction mechanism (pi,M), the social welfare realized by the al-
location rule pi is E
[∑N
n=1Qn(X)Xn
]
. From the IR constraint, this is at least R(pi). An efficient
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auction maximizes the realized social welfare. Since
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)Xn =
∑
A∈A
πA(X)
(∑
n∈A
Xn
)
, (11)
an efficient allocation rule pie(v) is any probability distribution over the set argmaxA∈A
(∑
n∈A vn
)
.
It is easy to verify that pie satisfies the monotonicity condition needed by Proposition 1. The
corresponding maximum social welfare (henceforth MSW) is given by:
MSW(x1:N ,p1:N ;A) = E
[
max
A∈A
(∑
n∈A
Xn
)]
, (12)
where x1:N and p1:N are as defined in Section 2.
By contrast, an optimal auction, described in Section 3, involves maximizing the sum of MVVs
instead of the sum of true valuations. Consequently, it differs from an efficient auction in three
ways. First, the buyers with negative MVVs (equivalently, their bids are below their respective
reserve prices) do not win. Second, even if the bid of one buyer is higher than that of another,
their corresponding MVVs might be in a different order. Hence, in single item optimal auctions,
the winner is not necessarily the buyer with the highest valuation for the item. Finally, for a
multiple item auction with single-parameter buyers, the allocation that maximizes the sum of the
MVVs might be different from the one that maximizes the sum of the true valuations. These three
differences are highlighted by the following examples:
Example 1. Consider two i.i.d. buyers competing for one item. Their possible values for the item
are {1, 2} with probabilities {1/3, 2/3} respectively. An efficient auction, like VCG, will award the
item to the highest bidder and charge him the price equal to the second highest bid. Hence, the
revenue generated by VCG is 2 ∗ (2/3)2 +1− (2/3)2 < 1.45. However, the optimal auction sets the
reserve price equal to 2 (since wn(1) < 0), and awards the item to any buyer with value 2. The
revenue collected by the optimal auction is 2 ∗ (1 − (1/3)2) > 1.77. Notice that unlike VCG, the
item is not sold when both the buyers have their values equal to 1. Hence, the optimal auction
loses in efficiency.
Example 2. Consider two buyers competing for one item. Buyer 1 takes values {5, 10} each with
probability 0.5. Buyer 2 takes values {1, 2}, independent of buyer 1, each with probability 0.5. An
efficient auction will always award the item to buyer 1. Any auction that always awards the item
to buyer 1 cannot him charge more than 5, else buyer 1 will misreport his value. Now consider
another auction that gives the item to buyer 1 only if he bids 10 and charges him 10, otherwise, the
item is given to buyer 1 at the price 1. It is easy to see that this auction is incentive compatible.
The revenue that this auction generates is 0.5 ∗ 10 + 0.5 ∗ 1 = 5.5. Since the optimal auction must
extract at least this much revenue, it cannot always award the item to the buyer 1. In fact, it can
be verified that the second auction is indeed optimal. By not awarding the item to the buyer with
the highest value for it, the optimal auction again loses in efficiency.
Example 3. Consider 3 single-minded buyers with known bundles competing for 4 items. Buyer 1
wants the items (A,B), buyer 2 wants the items (B,C), and buyer 3 wants the items (C,D). Thus,
buyers (1, 3) and buyer 2 cannot get their respective bundles simultaneously. Buyers are i.i.d. with
values {1, 8/5}, each with probability 0.5. Suppose that their true values are (1, 8/5, 1) respectively.
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An efficient auction, like VCG, will select buyers 1 and 3 as winners since this maximizes the total
value of the allocation. However, since 2 ∗ wn(1) = 2 ∗ 2/5 < wn(8/5) = 8/5, the optimal auction
will select buyer 2 as the winner. Again, there is a loss in efficiency because the optimal allocation
is not necessarily the efficient one.
The social welfare realized by an optimal allocation cannot be more than the MSW. We quantify
how much an optimal allocations loses in the realized social welfare when compared with the MSW.
We normalize this loss in the realized welfare by the MSW. Let pio be an optimal allocation rule
given by Algorithm 1, and let [Qon]n∈N be obtained from pi
o by (1). Given a random vector X
denoting valuations of buyers, we define efficiency loss ratio (ELR) as:
ELR(pio,x1:N ,p1:N ;A) ,
MSW(x1:N ,p1:N ;A)− E
[∑N
n=1Q
o
n(X)Xn
]
MSW(x1:N ,p1:N ;A)
. (13)
Recalling step 2 of Algorithm 1, any optimal allocation rule pio is a probability distribution
on W(v). Different probability distributions on W(v) correspond to different tie-breaking rules for
selecting a set of winners W (v) ∈ W(v)5. They result in the same expected revenue but different
realized social welfare. Since the tie-breaking rule is determined by the auction designer (or the
seller), we break tie in the favor of the allocation rule that maximizes the social welfare realized
within the set of optimal allocations (see Section 5 for a related discussion). Call the resulting
allocation rule p˜io.
Given r > 1 and a positive integer K, define Dr,K as the set of (x1:N ,p1:N ) satisfying the
following properties:
1. For each n ∈ N , 0 < x1n < x
2
n < . . . < x
Kn
n , and pn is a valid probability vector of dimen-
sion Kn, where Kn ≤ K,
2. (maxn∈N x
Kn
n )/(minn∈N x
1
n) ≤ r,
3. For all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, p
i
n > 0.
The worst case ELR, denoted by η(r,K;A), is defined as:
η(r,K;A) , sup
(x1:N ,p1:N )∈Dr,K
ELR(p˜io,x1:N ,p1:N ;A). (14)
The MSW is continuous in x1:N and p1:N . A slight perturbation in x
i
n’s or in p
i
n’s can make the
MVVs that are zero negative, but still very close to zero, while causing a very small change in the
MSW. Hence, even if we restrict to optimal allocations that only include the buyers with positive
MVVs, the supremum in (14) remains unchanged. Consequently, in the subsequent treatment, for
the ease of analysis, we will confine to an efficient allocation within the set of optimal allocations
that only includes the buyers with positive MVVs. For notational convenience, we drop x1:N , p1:N ,
and A from the arguments of the MSW and ELR functions defined by (12) and (13) whenever the
underlying x1:N , p1:N , and A are clear from the context.
5The tie-breaking rule must be consistent in the following sense: let vn and v̂n be such that vn < v̂n, but
wn(vn) = wn(v̂n), then P [n ∈W (vn,v−n)] ≤ P [n ∈W (v̂n,v−n)] for any v−n.
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4.1 Auctions with binary valued single-parameter buyers
We first bound the worst case ELR for optimal auctions with binary valued single-parameter buyers.
Assume that each random variable Xn takes only two values, Hn and Ln, with probabilities pn and
1−pn respectively. Here, Hn > Ln > 0. The virtual-valuation function wn is given by wn(Hn) = Hn
and wn(Ln) = (Ln−pnHn)/(1−pn). Clearly, wn(Ln) < wn(Hn), and hence, wn = wn. The reserve
price x∗n for buyer n is Hn if pnHn ≥ Ln, otherwise it is equal to Ln.
Example 4. Suppose there is only one buyer. We drop the subscript n because n ≡ 1. The
buyer’s value for winning, X, is H with probability p and L otherwise, where 0 < L < H. Here,
A = {∅, {1}}. If pH < L, then buyer 1 always wins under the optimal allocation, irrespective
of the value of X. This is also the efficient allocation. However, if pH ≥ L, then w(L) ≤ 0
and buyer 1 wins only if he bids H. This is not efficient because the buyer is not a winner if
X = L. The social welfare realized is pH while the MSW = pH + (1− p)L. Therefore ELR(pio) =
(1− p)L/(pH + (1− p)L) = (1− p)/(pr+1− p), where H/L = r. Since pr ≥ 1, ELR is maximized
by setting p = 1/r. For this choice of p, we get ELR(pio) = (r − 1)/(2r − 1). As r → ∞ (so
p = 1/r → 0), ELR(pio)→ 1/2.
The following proposition shows that the worst case ELR for multiple binary valued single-
parameter buyers is no worse than it is for the one buyer example given above.
Proposition 3. Given any r > 1, the worst case ELR for binary valued single-parameter buyers,
denoted by η(r, 2;A), satisfies: η(r, 2;A) ≤ (r − 1)/(2r − 1) ≤ 1/2.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Notice that the upper bound in Proposition 3 holds for any tie-breaking rule, any values of r
and N , and any A. The bound η(r, 2;A) ≤ 1/2, which holds uniformly over all r, can be improved
further by putting some constraints on the structure of A and on Xn’s. The following result on
auction of S identical items, where buyers are binary valued and have same priors, describes one
such case.
Proposition 4. Let Xn’s be i.i.d. random variables taking values H and L, where H > L > 0,
with probabilities p and 1 − p respectively. Let A = {A : A ⊆ N , |A| ≤ S}, where S ≤ N . Then,
the worst case ELR satisfies: η(r, 2;A) ≤ S/(S +N), and in particular, η(∞, 2;A) = S/(S +N).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
We conjecture that the bound S/(S+N) on the worst case ELR holds uniformly over all r even
for any collections of binary valued single-parameter i.i.d. buyers such that the cardinality of any
possible set of winners is at most S (but not necessarily containing all subsets of N of cardinality
at most S); i.e., if A ∈ A then |A| ≤ S. We have the following preliminary result6:
Proposition 5. Let Xn’s be i.i.d. random variables taking values H and L, where H > L > 0,
with probabilities p and 1− p respectively. Let A be such that if A ∈ A then |A| ≤ S, and pi be any
optimal allocation rule. Then,
lim
p→∞
(
sup
H,L: pH≥L
ELR(pio) =
S
S +N
)
.
6Proposition 5 restricts to probability distributions such that the reserve price is H . It is expected that loss in
efficiency in the case of reserve price equal to H will be higher than that with reserve price equal to L. Simulations
on randomly generated A are consistent with the conjecture.
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Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.
4.2 Single item auctions with i.i.d. buyers
We now consider single item auctions where Xn’s are i.i.d. Each Xn takes K discrete values
{x1, x2, . . . , xK}, where 0 < x1 < x2 < . . . < xK and P
[
Xn = x
i
]
= pi > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K.
Here, A consists of singletons (and empty set ∅) only. An efficient allocation simply awards the item
to a buyer with the highest valuation for it. The corresponding MSW is E [maxn∈N Xn]. Define z
i
as:
zi , P
[
max
n∈N
Xn = x
i
]
=
( i∑
j=1
pj
)N
−
( i−1∑
j=1
pj
)N
, (15)
with the notational convention of
∑j=0
j=1(.) = 0. With this, the MSW is equal to
∑K
i=1 z
ixi.
An optimal allocation awards the item to a buyer with the highest positive MVV. The MVVs
are nondecreasing in the true values but need not be strictly increasing. Tie is broken is the favor
of a buyer with the highest value for the item. This maximizes the social welfare realized within
the set of optimal allocations. Since Xn’s are i.i.d., the reserve prices are same for everyone. Hence,
the optimal allocation rule p˜io sets a common reserve price for everyone and awards the item to
the buyer with the highest valuation for it. The loss in efficiency is only because of not selling the
item if the maximum bid of all the buyers is below the common reserve price.
Let p , (p1, p2, . . . , pK) and x , (x1, x2, . . . , xK). Let the reserve price be xt(x,p), where t(x,p)
is the index corresponding to the reserve price. From (10),
t(x,p) =
{
max i : i ∈ argmax
k:1≤k≤K
xk(
K∑
j=k
pj)
}
. (16)
The social welfare realized by the optimal allocation is
∑K
i=t(x,p) z
ixi. Hence, the ELR for single
item auctions as a function of x and p is given by:
ELR(x,p, N) =
∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 z
ixi∑K
i=1 z
ixi
, (17)
where we use ELR(x,p, N) to denote the ELR function defined by (13). This is because xn and pn
are same for all n ∈ N , A contains only singletons, and p˜io is kept fixed in the subsequent discussion.
The worst-case ELR is given by the following optimization problem:
maximize
x,p
ELR(x,p, N), (18)
subject to: pi > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K,
∑K
i=1 p
i = 1,
0 < x1 < x2 < . . . < xK , xK ≤ rx1.
(19)
The optimum value of the above problem is denoted by η(r,K,N). The following proposition
shows that the optimization problem defined by (18) and (19) can be reduced to a relatively simple
optimization problem involving only the common probability vector of the buyers.
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Proposition 6. Let γ∗(r,K,N) be the value of the optimization problem given below.
maximize
p
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
)
,
subject to: pK =
1
r
,
K∑
i=1
pi = 1, pi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ K. (20)
Then the worst case ELR for single item auctions is:
η(r,K,N) =
γ∗(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1
+ γ∗(r,K,N)
.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Corollary 1. For single item auctions with binary valued i.i.d. buyers, the worst case ELR,
denoted by η(r, 2, N), is given by:
η(r, 2, N) =
1∑N
i=0
(
r
r−1
)i < 1N + 1 . (21)
Moreover, equality is achieved by letting r →∞.
Proof. From Proposition 6 and (15), γ∗(r, 2, N) = (1− 1/r)N . Thus,
η(r, 2, N) =
γ∗(r, 2, N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1
+ γ∗(r, 2, N)
=
(r − 1)N
r (rN − (r − 1)N ) + (r − 1)N
,
=
(r − 1)N
rN+1 − (r − 1)N+1
=
1∑N
i=0
(
r
r−1
)i .
Since r/(r − 1) > 1, η(r, 2, N) < 1/(N + 1). The second part of the corollary is easy to verify.
As a consequence of Proposition 6, we obtain a closed form expression for the worst case ELR
for single buyer case, and lower and upper bounds on the worst case ELR for multiple buyers.
Proposition 7. For the case of only one buyer, the solution to the optimization problem defined
in Proposition 6 is given by:
γ∗(r,K, 1) = (K − 1)
(
1− r
−1
K−1
)
.
Consequently, the worst case ELR, denoted by η(r,K, 1), is η(r,K, 1) = γ∗(r,K, 1)/(1+γ∗(r,K, 1)).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix E.
Corollary 2. For a fixedK, η(r,K, 1) < 1−1/K, uniformly over all r > 1, and limr→∞ η(r,K, 1) =
1 − 1/K. For a fixed r, η(r,K, 1) ≤ ln(r)/(1 + ln(r)), uniformly over all positive integers K, and
limK→∞ η(r,K, 1) = ln(r)/(1 + ln(r)).
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Proof. The first part follows easily by observing that η(r,K, 1) is an increasing function of r and
by letting r →∞. For the second part, notice that for any a ≥ 0,(
1− r−a
a
)
=
(
1− e−a ln(r)
a
)
≤
(
a ln(r)
a
)
= ln(r).
Also, notice that, lima→0(1− r
−a)/a = ln(r). Taking a = 1/(K − 1) gives the result.
Proposition 8. Define γ∗1(r,K,N) and γ
∗
2(r,K,N) as following:
γ∗1(r,K,N) , N
[
∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1−
1
r
)i(
1−
1
K − 1
)i]
,
γ∗2(r,K,N) , N
[
∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1−
1
r
)i]
.
Then, for auctions with N i.i.d. buyers and K > 2, the worst case ELR, denoted by η(r,K,N),
satisfies:
γ∗1(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1
+ γ∗1(r,K,N)
≤ η(r,K,N) ≤
γ∗2(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1
+ γ∗2(r,K,N)
.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix F.
Corollary 3. Bounds given in Proposition 8 are tight asymptotically as K → ∞. Moreover,
limN→∞ η(r,K,N) = 0 and limr→∞ (limK→∞ η(r,K,N)) = 1. Also, keeping r and K fixed, the
worst case ELR goes to zero as N goes to infinity at the rate O
(
(1− 1/r)N
)
.
Proof. The first part follows easily from the observation that limK→∞ γ
∗
1(r,K,N) = γ
∗
2(r,K,N).
The third part follows since limr→∞ γ
∗
2(r,K,N) = ∞. For the second part, notice that for any
0 < a < 1,
N
∞∑
i=N
ai
i
<
∞∑
i=N
ai =
aN
1− a
→ 0 as N →∞.
From above, γ∗2(r,K,N) ≤ (r − 1)
N/rN−1. Hence, η(r,K,N) ≤ (1− 1/r)N .
4.3 Single item auctions with different priors
As described earlier, if priors are different, the seller might set different reserve prices for different
buyers. In addition, he need not always award the item to the buyer with the highest reported
value for the item. We first obtain a lower bound on the worst case ELR that is almost the same
as the worst case ELR with only one buyer.
Proposition 9. For single item auctions with multiple buyers with different priors, the worst case
ELR, denoted by η(r,K,N) (14), satisfy:
η(r,K,N) ≥
γ∗(r,K, 1) −
(
1− 1
r
)
1 + γ∗(r,K, 1)
,
where γ∗ is as defined in Proposition 7.
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Proof. The proof is given in Appendix G.
For large values of r and K, the lower bound of Proposition 9 is close to the worst case ELR
for the single buyer case given by Proposition 7. Moreover, it is independent of N and shows that
the ELR does not go below this lower bound even if there are large number of buyers.
The following example shows the worst ELR computation for a special case of single item
auctions with binary valued buyers.
Example 5. Consider N binary valued buyers competing for one item. Let the value of the item
for a buyer n be denoted by the random variable Xn taking values (L,Hn) with probabilities
(1 − pn, pn) respectively. Buyers are numbered such that L < H1 < H2 < . . .HN . For any buyer
n, the virtual-valuation function satisfies wn(Hn) = Hn and wn(L) < L. Hence, if there is at least
one buyer with value greater than L, the optimal auction will allocate the item to the buyer with
the highest value. If all buyers have their values equal to L, but there is at least one buyer m
such that his virtual valuation at L is positive, i.e., wm(L) > 0, then the welfare generated by an
optimal auction will be L (irrespective of who gets the item). Thus, loss in efficiency occurs only
when Xn = L and wn(L) ≤ 0 for all n. Notice that, wn(L) ≤ 0 is equivalent to pnHn ≥ L. The
MSW in this case is:
MSW = E
[
max
1≤n≤N
Xn
]
= pNHN +
N−1∑
n=1
(
N∏
m=n+1
(1− pm)pnHn
)
+
N∏
n=1
(1− pn)L,
while the loss in the realize social welfare is
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L. Hence, the ELR is given by:
ELR =
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
pNHN +
∑N−1
n=1
(∏N
m=n+1(1− pm)pnHn
)
+
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
,
≤
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
L+
∑N−1
n=1
(∏N
m=n+1(1− pm)L
)
+
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
,
=
1
1 +
∑N
n=1 (
∏n
m=1(1− pm)
−1)
≤
1
N + 1
,
where the first inequality follows from pnHn ≥ L for all n.
5 Discussion
(a) On tie breaking : Although we have set up the worst case ELR problem under breaking ties
in the favor of the most efficient allocation among the set of optimal allocations, we can also
define the worst case ELR where ties are broken in the favor of the least efficient allocation
among the set of optimal allocations. The results of Section 4.1 still hold true. Also, the lower
bound on the ELR of Section 4.2 for single item auctions with multiple buyers is still a valid
lower bound under this tie breaking.
(b) Bounds on information rent : The expected difference between the revenue that the seller
could have extracted if he exactly knew the buyers’ type (same as the MSW) and the revenue
collected by an optimal auction under private types is called information rent. Because of the
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IR constraint, the optimal revenue cannot be larger than the realized social welfare. Hence,
the ELR is less than or equal to the ratio of information rent and the MSW. Also, notice that
the proof of Proposition 3 bounds the worst case ELR by finding an upper bound on the ratio
of information rent and the MSW.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we highlighted the differences between the objectives of revenue maximization and
social welfare maximization. We quantified this as the loss in efficiency in optimal auctions and
obtained bounds on the same for various cases. A summary of the results is presented in Table 1.
Case ELR bounds
N binary valued single-parameter buyers ELR ≤
r − 1
2r − 1
≤
1
2
N binary valued single-parameter i.i.d.. buyers,
ELR ≤ min
{
S
S +N
,
r − 1
2r − 1
}
auction of S identical items, S ≤ N
Single item auction, 1 buyer, K discrete values ELR =
γ∗
1 + γ∗
, γ∗ = (K − 1)
(
1− r
−1
K−1
)
Single item auction, N i.i.d. buyers, K = 2 ELR =
[∑N
i=0
(
r
r−1
)i]−1
≤ 1
N+1
Single item auction, N i.i.d. buyers, K > 2
γ1
1 + γ1
≤ ELR ≤
γ2
1 + γ2
,
γ1 = N
[∑∞
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1
r
)i (
1− 1
K−1
)i]
,
γ2 = N
[∑∞
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1
r
)i]
Table 1: Efficiency loss in revenue optimal auctions - summary of the results.
An interesting extension would be to show that even if the private valuations (or types) of buyers
can take more than two values, for optimal auctions with single-parameter buyers with independent
(not necessarily identically distributed) private values, the worst case loss in efficiency is no worse
than that with only one buyer. Another possible extension would be to establish the conjecture
that the ELR bound S/(S + N) holds for optimal auctions with binary valued single-parameter
i.i.d. buyers, where any possible set of winners has cardinality at most S, but not any set of buyers
with cardinality at most S can win simultaneously.
A Proof of Proposition 3
We will prove a somewhat stronger result. Namely, that if Hn/Ln ≤ r for all n ∈ N , then
ELR(pio) ≤ (r − 1)/(2r − 1) for any optimal allocation rule pio. The realized social welfare for
any allocation rule pi satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1 is at least R(pi). Thus, it suffices
to show that R(pio) ≥ rMSW/(2r − 1). By the optimality of pio, R(pio) ≥ R(p̂i) for any other
allocation rule p̂i satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1. Thus, it suffices to produce such an
allocation rule p̂i satisfying R(p̂i) ≥ rMSW/(2r − 1).
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We construct p̂i by starting with some efficient allocation rule pie, and modifying it. Specif-
ically, p̂i produces the same set of winners as pie, except that any buyer n with Xn = Ln and
wn(Ln) ≤ 0 is not a winner under p̂i. The allocation rule p̂i satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1,
just as pie does. Since
R(p̂i) =
N∑
n=1
(
pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)q
e
n(Ln) [wn(Ln)]
+) ,
and MSW =
∑N
n=1 (pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)q
e
n(Ln)Ln), it suffices to show that:
pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)q
e
n(Ln) [wn(Ln)]
+ ≥
r
2r − 1
(pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)q
e
n(Ln)Ln) ,
for all n ∈ N . Since qen(Hn) ≥ q
e
n(Ln) and r/(2r − 1) < 1, it is sufficient to prove:
pnq
e
n(Ln)Hn + (1− pn)q
e
n(Ln) [wn(Ln)]
+ ≥
r
2r − 1
(pnq
e
n(Ln)Hn + (1− pn)q
e
n(Ln)Ln) ,
or, equivalently, pnHn + (1− pn) [wn(Ln)]
+ ≥
r
2r − 1
(pnHn + (1− pn)Ln) . (22)
Define rn , Hn/Ln ≤ r. We prove the inequality (22) by considering the following two cases.
First assume that pnrn ≥ 1. Then w(Ln) ≤ 0, and proving inequality (22) simplifies to showing
that:
1− pn
pnrn + 1− pn
≤
1− r
2r − 1
.
However, the above follows easily from Example 4 and by noticing that:
1− rn
2rn − 1
≤
1− r
2r − 1
.
Next, assume that pnrn < 1. Then, w(L) > 0, and pnHn+(1−pn) [wn(Ln)]
+ = Ln, and proving
inequality (22) simplifies to showing that:
pn(rn − 1) ≤ 1−
1
r
.
Since pnrn < 1, the left side of above is less than or equal to 1 − 1/rn ≤ 1 − 1/r. This completes
the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 4
Because Xn’s are i.i.d. random variables, the virtual-valuation functions wn’s are same for all n, we
drop the subscript n and denote them by w. Given any bid vector v, let Ae(v) denote any efficient
allocation and Ao(v) denote any optimal allocation. Thus, Ae(v) ∈ argmaxA∈A
(∑
n∈A vn
)
, while
Ao(v) ∈ argmaxA∈A
(∑
n∈Aw(vn)
)
. Since A contains all subsets of N of size less than or equal
to S, and H = w(H) > L > w(L), we must have
∑
n∈Ae(v) 1{vn=H} =
∑
n∈Ao(v) 1{vn=H}. If
w(L) > 0, then clearly,
∑
n∈Ae(v) 1{vn=L} =
∑
n∈Ao(v) 1{vn=L}. Hence, an optimal allocation is
efficient if w(L) > 0. Assuming w(L) ≤ 0, an efficient allocation selects the buyers corresponding
to the top S bids, while an optimal allocation selects only the buyers who bid H and no more
16
than S such buyers. Thus, an optimal allocation is not efficient if w(L) ≤ 0, and if there are less
than S buyers with type H. So, for the remainder of the proof, we assume that w(L) ≤ 0, or
equivalently, pH ≥ L.
Let Y =
∑N
n=1 1{Xn=H} be the random variable denoting the number of buyers with value H.
Clearly, Y ∼ Binomial(N, p). Also, since the ELR is invariant to scaling of H and L, we can set
L = 1 and pH ≥ 1. With this, the MSW is simply E [(S ∧ Y )H + S − S ∧ Y ] while the loss in
the social welfare realized by an optimal auction, when compared with the MSW, is E [S − S ∧ Y ],
where ∧ is the min operator. The ELR only depends on H, p, and A. Since A is same throughout
the proof, we use ELR(H, p) to denote the ELR function defined by (13). Hence,
ELR(H, p) =
E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E [(S ∧ Y )H + S − S ∧ Y ]
≤
E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E
[
S∧Y
p
+ S − S ∧ Y
] = ELR(1
p
, p
)
, (23)
where the inequality is because of pH ≥ 1. It is easily verified that:
E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E
[
S∧Y
p
+ S − S ∧ Y
] ≤ S
S +N
⇔ E [S ∧ Y ] ≥
E [Y ]S
E [Y ] + S
, (24)
where E [Y ] = Np. Thus, it is sufficient to prove E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [Y ]S/(E [Y ] + S). We use the
following result:
Proposition 10 (Hoeffding [12]). Let T =
∑N
j=1 Ij, where I1, I2, . . . , IN are independent Bernoulli
random variables with parameters p1, p2, . . . , pN . If E [T ] = Np and f : R 7→ R is a function
satisfying:
f(j + 2)− 2f(j + 1) + f(j) ≥ 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 2,
then,
E [f(T )] ≤
N∑
j=0
f(j)
(
N
j
)
pj(1− p)N−j .
Take f(j) = −(S ∧ j). Consider independent Bernoulli random variables I1, I2, . . . , IN+L where
Ij is Bernoulli(p) for j ≤ N , and is equal to 0 for j > N . Define T˜ =
∑N+L
j=1 Ij and let T
′
be a random variable distributed as Binomial
(
N + L,Np/(N + L)
)
. Using the above proposi-
tion, E
[
S ∧ T˜
]
≥ E
[
S ∧ T
′
]
. But, E
[
S ∧ T˜
]
= E [S ∧ Y ], since Ij = 0 for j > N . This im-
plies E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E
[
S ∧ T
′
]
. As L → ∞, T
′
→ Z in distribution, where Z ∼ Poission(Np).
Thus, E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [S ∧ Z]. Hence, it remains to show that E [S ∧ Z] ≥ E [Z]S/(E [Z] + S) =
E [Y ]S/(E [Y ] + S). Equivalent forms of the desired inequality are given as follows:
E [S ∧ Z] ≥
E [Z]S
E [Z] + S
,
⇔ S − E [S ∧ Z] ≤
S2
S + E [Z]
,
⇔ S2 ≥ (Np+ S)(S − E [S ∧ Z]),
⇔ S2eλ ≥ (λ+ S)
S−1∑
j=0
(S − j)λj
j!
where λ = Np. (25)
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To prove (25), we compare the coefficients of λj on left and right sides. We only need to check
for 0 ≤ j ≤ S. For j = 0, coefficients on both the left and the right sides are S2. For j = S, since
S2/S! ≥ 1/(S − 1)!, the left coefficient is greater than the right one. For 1 ≤ j ≤ S − 1, the left
coefficient is greater than the right coefficient if:
S2
j!
≥
S(S − j)
j!
+
S − j + 1
(j − 1)!
,
⇔ S2 ≥ S(S − j) + j(S − j + 1) = S2 − j2 − 1,
which is true. Hence, E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [S ∧ Z] ≥ E [Z]S/(E [Z]+S) = E [Y ]S/(E [Y ]+S). This along
with (23) and (24) implies:
ELR(H, p) ≤ ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤
S
S +N
.
To show that the bound is approachable, notice that:
lim
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
= lim
p→0
 E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E
[
S∧Y
p
+ S − S ∧ Y
]
 = S
S +N
,
since limp→0 E [S ∧ Y ] /p = N and limp→0E [S ∧ Y ] = 0. The proof is complete.
C Proof of Proposition 5
Notice that here A is any collection of all possible sets of winners such that if A ∈ A then |A| ≤ S.
In particular, A contains all singletons {n}, n ∈ N . Similar to the proof of Proposition 4, we take
L = 1 and pH ≥ 1, use w for the common virtual-valuation function. Then [w(L)]+ = 0 (reserve
price is equal to H) and w(H) = H.
Given a bid vector v, define the functions fH and fL as fH(A,v) ,
∑
n∈A 1{vn=H} and
fL(A,v) ,
∑
n∈A 1{Xn=L}, where A ⊆ N . Then, an optimal allocation rule selects a winner
set from argmaxA∈A fH(A,v) and the social welfare realized is E [maxA∈A fH(A,X)H]. The MSW
is E [maxA∈A [fH(A,X)H + fL(A,X)]]. The ELR only depends on H, p, and A. Since A is same
throughout the proof, we use ELR(H, p) to denote the ELR function defined by (13). Then,
ELR(H, p) =
E [maxA∈A [fH(A,X)H + fL(A,X)]]− E [maxA∈A fH(A,X)H]
E [maxA∈A [fH(A,X)H + fL(A,X)]]
,
≤
E [maxA∈A [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]− E [maxA∈A fH(A,X)]
E [maxA∈A [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]
= ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
, (26)
where the inequality follows since pH ≥ 1. Hence,
sup
H,L:pH≥L
ELR(H, p) = ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
. (27)
Since S = maxA∈A |A|, if S = N , then by the downward closed property, A would contain
all subsets of N . The result then follows from Proposition 4. Hence, assume 1 ≤ S < N . Also,
without loss of generality, assume that the set with cardinality S in A is B = {1, 2, . . . , S}. Define
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A1 , {A : A ⊆ B, or A = {n} for S + 1 ≤ n ≤ N} and A2 , {A : A ⊆ N , |A| ≤ S}. As A1 ⊆ A ⊆
A2, we get:
E
[
max
A∈A1
fH(A,X)
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A
fH(A,X)
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A2
fH(A,X)
]
, (28)
and
E
[
max
A∈A1
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A2
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
. (29)
From (26), (28), and (29), we get:
E [maxA∈A1 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]− E [maxA∈A2 fH(A,X)]
E [maxA∈A1 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]
≤ ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤
E [maxA∈A2 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]− E [maxA∈A1 fH(A,X)]
E [maxA∈A2 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]
. (30)
Define Y ,
∑N
n=1 1{Xn=H} and φ(S,X) , maxn:S+1≤n≤N Xn. Then, Y ∼ Binomial(N, p). Since
we are interested in limp→0 ELR(1/p, p), we can take pS < 1. With these we get:
E
[
max
A∈A1
fH(A,X)
]
= E
[
fH(B,X) + 1{fH (B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=H}
]
,
= Sp+ (1− p)S
[
1− (1− p)N−S
]
= Sp+ (1− p)S − (1− p)N , (31)
and,
E
[
max
A∈A2
fH(A,X)
]
= E [Y ∧ S] . (32)
Similarly,
E
[
max
A∈A1
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
= E
[
(fH(B,X) + pfL(B,X)) 1{fH (B,X)≥1} + 1{fH (B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=H} + Sp1{fH(B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=L}
]
,
= E
[
fH(B,X) + pfL(B,X) + (1− Sp)1{fH(B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=H}
]
,
= pS + p(1− p)S + (1− p)S
[
1− (1− p)N−S
]
(1− Sp),
= pS(2− p) +
[
(1− p)S − (1− p)N
]
(1− Sp), (33)
where the first equality uses the fact that pS < 1. Hence, when Xn = L, ∀n ∈ B, but Xn = H for
some S + 1 ≤ n ≤ N , then B cannot be an efficient allocation. Also,
E
[
max
A∈A2
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
= E [S ∧ Y + p(S − S ∧ Y )] = pS + (1− p)E [S ∧ Y ] . (34)
Using (30), (32), and (33), we get:
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≥
pS(2− p) +
[
(1− p)S − (1− p)N
]
(1− Sp)− E [Y ∧ S]
pS(2− p) + [(1− p)S − (1− p)N ] (1− Sp)
⇒ lim inf
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≥
2S +N − S −N
2S +N − S
=
S
S +N
, (35)
19
where limit in the right side is obtained by dividing both numerator and denominator by p, and
noticing that limp→0E [S ∧ Y ] /p = N . Similarly, using (30), (31), and (34), we get:
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤
pS + (1− p)E [S ∧ Y ]−
(
Sp+ (1− p)S − (1− p)N
)
pS + (1− p)E [S ∧ Y ]
,
⇒ lim sup
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤
S
S +N
, (36)
where limit in the right side is obtained by dividing both numerator and denominator by p, and
noticing that limp→0E [S ∧ Y ] /p = N .
Finally, from (35) and (35), we get:
lim
p→0
sup
H,L:pH≥L
ELR(H, p) = lim
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
=
S
S +N
,
which completes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 6
We start with the following lemmas that help us reduce the search space over x and p for solving
the optimization problem defined by (18) and (19).
Lemma 1. Given any (x,p) satisfying the constraints given by (19). If t(x,p) < K then there exists
vectors (x̂, p̂) of length t(x,p), satisfying the constraints given by (19), such that ELR(x̂, p̂, N) >
ELR(x,p, N).
Proof. Let t(x,p) < K. Construct (x̂, p̂) of length t(x,p) by removing {xi : i > t(x,p)} from x
and by assigning the probability of the removed xi’s to xt(x,p). Let ẑ be obtained from p̂ by (15).
Then,
(x̂i, p̂i, ẑi) =

(xi, pi, zi) if i < t(x,p),(
xt(x,p),
∑K
i=t(x,p) p
i, 1−
(∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 p
i
)N)
if i = t(x,p).
(37)
Using (16), for any i < t(x,p), we have xt(x,p)(
∑K
j=t(x,p) p
j) ≥ xi(
∑K
j=i p
j). Hence, t(x̂, p̂) = t(x,p)
implying that the reserve price for (x̂, p̂) is same as the original reserve price. Thus,
ELR(x̂, p̂, N) =
∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 z
ixi∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 z
ixi + ẑt(x,p)xt(x,p)
.
The constraints given by (19), together with (15) and (37), imply:
K∑
i=t(x,p)
zixi >
( K∑
i=t(x,p)
zi
)
xt(x,p) =
(
1−
( t(x,p)−1∑
i=1
pi
)N)
xt(x,p) = ẑt(x,p)x̂t(x,p).
Hence ELR(x̂, p̂, N) > ELR(x,p, N), and the proof is complete.
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We later establish that the worst case ELR obtained by confining only to those (x,p) such that,
t(x,p) = K, is nondecreasing in K for a fixed r and N . This, along with Lemma 1, imply that
t(x,p) = K can be imposed as an additional constraint in the optimization problem (18)-(19) with
no loss of optimality.
Lemma 2. Let zi’s be given by (15) and γ(r,K,N) be the value of the optimization problem given
below.
maximize
p
pK
zK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
))
, (38)
subject to: rpK ≥ 1,
K∑
i=1
pi = 1, pi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ K. (39)
Then the worst case ELR, η(r,K,N), defined by (18)-(19), is equal to γ(r,K,N)/(1 + γ(r,K,N)).
Proof. From (16), we have the following equivalence:
t(x,p) = K ⇔ xi ≤
pKxK∑K
j=i p
j
, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. (40)
Since the ELR is invariant to scaling of x, we can fix xK = r. The constraint xK/x1 ≤ r then
reduces to x1 ≥ 1, and hence we must have rpK ≥ 1. Fixing p (and hence fixing z), and set-
ting xK = r, we see from (17) that ELR(x,p, N) is increasing in each xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1.
Hence, set xi = (rpK)/(
∑K
j=i p
j). Also, maximizing ELR(x,p, N) is equivalent to maximizing
(
∑K−1
i=1 z
ixi)/(zKxK). The proof easily follows from these observations.
Lemma 3. γ(r,K,N) defined in Lemma 2 is nondecreasing in K for fixed r and N .
Proof. Let p be any vector of dimension K satisfying the constraints given by (39). Construct p̂
of dimension K + 1 as p̂ = (ǫ, p1 − ǫ, p2, . . . , pK), where 0 < ǫ < p1. Clearly, p̂ satisfies the K + 1
dimension version of the constraints given by (39). Let ẑ be obtained from p̂ using (15). Thus,
p̂K+1
ẑK+1
(
K∑
i=1
(
ẑi∑K+1
j=i p̂
j
))
≤ γ(r,K + 1, N).
The above inequality holds for all ǫ ∈ (0, p1) and all p satisfying the constraints given by (39). The
left side of it can be made equal to γ(r,K,N) by letting ǫ ↓ 0 followed by taking supremum over
all p satisfying (39). This proves γ(r,K,N) ≤ γ(r,K + 1, N).
Lemma 4. The constraint rpK ≥ 1 for the optimization problem defined in Lemma 2 can be made
tight.
Proof. Consider any p satisfying (39) with rpK > 1. Define p̂ as p̂i = (1 + ǫ)pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1,
and p̂K = pK − ǫ(1− pK), where ǫ > 0 is such that pK − ǫ(1− pK) ≥ 1/r. Clearly, p̂ satisfies (39).
Let z and ẑ be obtained from p and p̂ respectively using (15). For 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, ẑi = (1+ ǫ)Kzi.
Define the function f(p) as:
f(p) ,
pK
zK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
))
.
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Then,
f(p̂) =
p̂K
ẑK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
ẑi∑K
j=i p̂
j
))
,
=
(1 + ǫ)N p̂K
ẑK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K−1
j=i (1 + ǫ)p
j + pK − ǫ(1− pK)
))
,
=
(1 + ǫ)N p̂K
ẑK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j − ǫ(1−
∑K
j=i p
j)
))
.
Also,
(1 + ǫ)N p̂K
ẑK
=
(1 + ǫ)N p̂K
1− (1− p̂K)N
=
(1 + ǫ)N
1 + (1− p̂K) + (1− p̂K)2 + . . .+ (1− p̂K)N−1
,
=
(1 + ǫ)N
1 + (1 + ǫ)(1− pK) + (1 + ǫ)2(1− pK)2 + . . . + (1 + ǫ)N−1(1− pK)N−1
,
=
1
1
(1+ǫ)N
+ (1−p
K)
(1+ǫ)N−1
+ (1−p
K)2
(1+ǫ)N−2
+ . . . + (1−p
K)N−1
(1+ǫ)
,
which is an increasing function of ǫ. Since 1−
∑K
j=i p
j ≥ 0, f(p̂) is also an increasing function of ǫ and
hence f(p̂) > f(p). Thus, we can set ǫ to the maximum possible value at which pK−ǫ(1−pK) = 1/r.
This completes the proof.
Proposition 6 follows easily from Lemmas 1-4.
E Proof of Proposition 7
For N = 1, the objective function in the optimization problem defined in Proposition 6 simplifies
to
∑K−1
i=1
(
pi/(
∑K
j=i p
j)
)
with pK = 1/r. Construct the Lagrangian L(p, λ) as:
L(p, λ) =
K−1∑
i=1
(
pi∑K
j=i p
j
)
− λ
(
K∑
i=1
pi − 1
)
,
where the constraints pi > 0 is ignored for a while. We will later verify that pi’s obtained this way
indeed satisfy pi > 0. For 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, we have:
∂L(p, λ)
∂pi
= −
i−1∑
j=1
pj(∑K
l=j p
l
)2 + 1∑K
l=i p
l
−
pi(∑K
l=i p
l
)2 − λ. (41)
Set
∂L(p, λ)
∂pi
= 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K−1, and
∂L(p, λ)
∂λ
= 0. The latter implies
∑K
i=1 p
i = 1, and (41)
simplifies to:
−
i−1∑
j=1
pj(
1−
∑j−1
l=1 p
l
)2 + 1−∑il=1 pl(
1−
∑i−1
l=1 p
l
)2 = λ. (42)
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For i = 1, this gives p1 = 1 − λ. For i = 2, we get −p1 + (1 − p1 − p2)/(1 − p1)2 = λ, implying
p2 = λ(1−λ). Using induction argument, we show that pi = λi−1(1−λ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ K−1. Assume
that pj = λj−1(1−λ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ i−1.Then, 1−
∑j
l=1 p
l = 1−(1−λ)−λ(1−λ)−. . .−λj−1(1−λ) = λj .
From (42),
−
i−1∑
j=1
(
λj−1(1− λ)
λ2j−2
)
+
λi−1 − pi
λ2i−2
= λ,
⇔ −(1− λ)
i−1∑
j=1
(
1
λj−1
)
+
λi−1 − pi
λ2i−2
= λ,
⇔ pi = λi−1(1− λ),
and hence, proving the induction claim. Since
∑K−1
i=1 p
i = 1− 1/r ⇔ 1/r = 1 −
∑K−1
i=1 p
i = λK−1.
This gives λ = r
−1
K−1 . Thus, the optimum value of the optimization problem defined in Proposition
6 is:
K−1∑
i=1
(
pi∑K
j=i p
j
)
=
K−1∑
i=1
(
pi
1−
∑i−1
j=1 p
j
)
=
K−1∑
i=1
(
λi−1(1− λ)
λi−1
)
= (K − 1)(1 − λ).
Hence, γ∗(r,K, 1) = (K − 1)
(
1− r
−1
K−1
)
, and the proof is complete.
F Proof of Proposition 8
Let θi ,
∑i
j=1 p
j. Then zi = θNi − θ
N
i−1, and
zi∑K
j=i p
j
=
θNi − θ
N
i−1
1−
∑i−1
j=1 p
j
=
∫ θi
θi−1
(
NθN−1
1− θi−1
)
dθ ≤
∫ θi
θi−1
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ,
⇒
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
)
≤
∫ 1− 1
r
0
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ. (43)
For any a ∈ (0, 1),∫ a
0
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ = N
∫ a
0
(
−
(
1 + θ + . . .+ θN−2
)
+
1
1− θ
)
dq,
= −N
(
ln(1− a) +
N−1∑
i=1
ai
i
)
= N
∞∑
i=N
ai
i
. (44)
From (43) and (44), we get:
γ∗(r,K,N) ≤ N
[
∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1−
1
r
)i]
= γ∗2(r,K,N). (45)
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To obtain a lower bound, we take pi = (r − 1)/(r(K − 1)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. Assuming
K > 2,
zi∑K
j=i p
j
=
θNi − θ
N
i−1
1−
∑i−1
j=1 p
j
=
∫ θi
θi−1
(
NθN−1
1− θi−1
)
dθ ≥
∫ θi−1
θi−2
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ,
⇒
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
)
≥
∫ θK−2
0
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ, (46)
where the first inequality follows because the length of the interval θi − θi−1 is same for all i and
NθN−1/(1−θ) is an increasing function of θ. Also, θK−2 = 1−p
K−pK−1 = (1−1/r)
(
1−1/(K−1)
)
.
From (44) and (46),
γ∗(r,K,N) ≥ N
[
∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1−
1
r
)i(
1−
1
K − 1
)i]
= γ∗1(r,K,N). (47)
The required result follows from (45), (47), and by observing that:
η(r,K,N) =
γ∗(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1
+ γ∗(r,K,N)
.
G Proof of Proposition 9
Consider N buyers competing for one item. The types of buyers 1 to N−1 are in the range [1, 1+ǫ).
Let the type of buyer N can take K discrete values, denoted by the vector xN , and let pN be the
corresponding probability vector. We construct (xN ,pN ) on the lines of the proof of Proposition 7
in Appendix C. Let λ be such that λK−1 = (1+ ǫ)/r. Set piN = λ
i−1(1−λ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, and
pKN = (1+ǫ)/r. It is easy to verify that pN is a valid probability vector. Let x
i
N = (1+ǫ)/(
∑K
j=i p
j)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ K. Clearly, 1 + ǫ = x1N < x
2
N < . . . < x
K
N = r. The virtual-valuation function, wn, of
buyer N satisfies wN (x
i
N ) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. Buyer N dominates over the other buyers and
the MSW is
∑K
i=1 p
ixi. However, the seller does not sell to buyer N except when his type is xK . If
buyer N is not the winner, the social welfare realized cannot be more than 1 + ǫ. Hence, the loss
in the realized social welfare by an optimal auction is at least
∑K−1
i=1 p
i
Nx
i
N − (1 + ǫ)(1 − p
K
N ). Let
η(r,K,N) be the worst case ELR defined by (14). Then,
η(r,K,N) ≥
∑K−1
i=1 p
i
Nx
i
N − (1 + ǫ)(1− p
K
N )∑K
i=1 p
i
Nx
i
N
=
∑K−1
i=1
pi
N∑K
j=i p
j
N
− (1− pKN )∑K
i=1
pi
N∑K
j=i p
j
N
,
=
(K − 1)(1 − λ)−
(
1− 1+ǫ
r
)
1 + (K − 1)(1 − λ)
=
γ∗
(
r
1+ǫ ,K, 1
)
−
(
1− 1+ǫ
r
)
1 + γ∗
(
r
1+ǫ ,K, 1
) ,
where γ∗ is as defined in Proposition 7. In particular, taking limit as ǫ→ 0, we get:
η(r,K,N) ≥
γ∗(r,K, 1) −
(
1− 1
r
)
1 + γ∗(r,K, 1)
.
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